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COMMENT
GAME - POWER TO PROTECT AND REGULATE
VALIDITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA STATUTE
BARRING NONRESIDENT HUNTERS OF MIGRATORY WATERFOWL
N A legal maneuver apparently without precise precedent,
the legislature of South Dakota in 1947 enacted a statute
completely prohibiting all nonresidents from hunting migra-
tory waterfowl within the state., Challenged in a test suit by
a resident of Wisconsin, the act was recently upheld by the cir-
cuit court of South Dakota on the theory that the state owns
all the wildlife within its borders and has a right to deter-
mine who may hunt them.2 Since migratory waterfowl passed
under the control of the Federal Government as early as 1916
through'a method which has caused considerable controversy
among legal writers,- problems of fundamental importance
concerning the relationship of the state and Federal Govern-
ments in this field have arisen, particularly as relates to the
power of the state to enact such discriminatory legislation as
would amount to a breach of privileges and immunities.
A decade ago, it has been pointed out, the problems pre-
sented by nonresident hunting was not at all disturbing in
view of the fact that only one sportsman out of 130 could be
classified as a nonresident hunter., By 1946 the ratio had in-
creased to one out of thirty, and indications are that with a
growing national consciousness of the sports of hunting and
fishing the ratio would have gone higher but for the fact
that many states embarked upon legislative programs which
tended to discourage nonresident hunting by setting up dis-
criminatory hunting and fishing license fees in order to pre-
serve to the citizens of their own respective states exclusive
hunting privileges within those states. 5 It may be argued that
1 Session Laws S.D. (1947), c. 109, §2.
2 Grand Forks, N.D., Herald Feb. 21, 1950, p. 4, col. 1.
3 See, e.g., Black, Missouri v. Holland - A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism, 25 Il1. L. Rev. 911 (1931); Corwin, Game Protection and the Con-
stitution, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1916); 25 Yale L. J. 445 (1920); U. of Pa.L.Rev.
160 (1920).
4 What the States Charge You to Hunt, Outdoor Life, September, 1949, p. 21.
5 For example, Indiana charges its residents $1.50 for a hunting and fishing
license, but charges nonresidents $15.50, ten times as much. Louisiana permits
cost $2.00 when purchased by residents, $25 when bought by out-of-state visitors.
North Dakota charges residents $1.50 for a small game license and $5.00 for a
big game permit, but nonresidents pay $25 and $50 for the same privilege. Most
of these fees are fixed by executive proclamation, pursuant to legislative
authority. Id. at 23.
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this was intended, in many cases, to compensate for the grow-
ing cost of game conservation programs; yet as early as 1820
the State of New Jersey enacted a statute which declared it to
be unlawful ". . . for any person who is not at the time an
actual inhabitant and resident in this state, to rake or gather
clams, oysters, or shells, in any of the rivers, bays, or waters
in this state, on board of any canoe, flat, scow, boat, or other
vessel, not wholly owned by some person, inhabitant of, and
actually residing in this state . . ."
Vigorously attacked in the early case of Corfield v. Coryell,e
on. the ground that it abridged one of the privileges and im-
munities of a citizen of the United States, the statute was
nevertheless sustained on the ground that the people of New
Jersey held title to the fishing rights in their state as tenants
in common and could exclude nonresidents at their pleasure.
Discrimination this certainly was, and it serves to illustrate
how early in American law the subject of fishing and hunting
became controversial.
At an early date it was well-established law that the states
owned the wildlife within their borders.7 The Federal Govern-
ment took little interest in the conservation of fish and game
until 1913. In that year, alarmed at the rapid depletion of
migratory waterfowl, Congress passed an appropriations act
for the Department of Agriculture which provided for the
protection of migratory waterfowl by fixing a penalty upon
anyone taking such waterfowl illegally." Several district and
state court decisions held this act unconstitutional as an in-
fringement of the sovereign right of the states to control their
wildlife.s Blocked in this approach, the Federal Government
turned to the treaty power to do by indirection that which it
could not do directly. In 1916 the United States and Great
Britain entered into a treaty for the mutual protection of
6 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3,230 (E.D.Pa. 1823).
7 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed Cas.
546, No. 3,230 (E.D.Pa. 1823); Dapson v. Daly, 257 Mass. 195, 153 N.E. 454
(1926); People v. Soule, 238 Mich. 130, 213 N.W. 195 (1927); Herrin v. Suther-
land, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
8 37 Stat. 847 (1913).
9 United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed,
248 U.S. 594 (1919); United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915);
State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan 786, 153 Pac. 557 (1915); State v. Sawyer, 113 Me.
458, 94 Atl. 886 (1915).
10 39 Stat. 1702 (1916). This treaty was followed by a convention between the
United States and Mexico for the protection of migratory game birds and
game mammals concluded February 7, 1936. 49 Stat. 1555 (1936).
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waterfowl,1 which provided that both the United States and
Canada would regulate the hunting of migratory waterfowl.
This method succeeded. In Missouri v. Holland," the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that the State of Mis-
souri could not enjoin the treaty's enforcement upon the
ground that such treaty infringed upon the state's right to its
own property. "The whole foundation of the State's rights,"
said Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion, "is the
presence within their -jurisdiction of birds that yesterday
had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another state, and in
a week a thousand miles away."' 2
"To put the claim of the State upon title," he added, "is to
lean upon a slender reed."' 8
The power of Congress to establish standards as to the
taking of migratory waterfowl, as well as the power of the
Secretary of the Interior to permit the hunting of migratory
birds under the-terms of the treaty, depending upon distri-
bution, abundance, economic value, migrations, and breeding
habits is now well recognized.- This fact, it would appear,
is clearly inconsistent with the contention that ownership of
migratory waterfowl remfains in the states themselves, 5 or is
in the citizens of the various states respectively."
There are, however, other aspects of the problem. With re-
spect to' non-migratory waterfowl and other animals ferae
luaturae, it remains undisputed that ownership is in the several
states.'7 In Geer v. Connecticut, s a leading case on the point,
Mr. Justice White traced the evolution of the concept of state
ownership of wild game from the early law of the Greeks and
Romans to the present. Under the Roman law concept of
"imperium" (control), as distinguished from "dominium"
(ownership),' ° it has been said that the state may protect
the property right of the individual, not in wildfowl per se,
"1252 U.S. 416 (1920). Accord: United States v. Thompson, 258 Fed. 257
(E.D.Ark. 1919).
12 Id. at 434.
Is Ibid.
14 See United States v. Griffin, 12 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.Ga. 1935).
'5 Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of the State of Louisiana, 263 U.S.
545 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
16 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); Smith v.
Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U.S. 1855).
17 See cases cited note 15 eupra.
is 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
19 14 Corn. L. Q. 245 (1929).
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but in the hunting of these wildfowl for food. 20 Under the
police power, it has been universally held that the state may
regulate the methods used to take game and the seasons for
their taking,21 so long as the use of such power does not con-
flict with the treaty.22 Since the privilege of hunting or fishing
is either expressly or impliedly granted by the state and may
not, therefore, be considered to be an inherent right of the
individual, it may well be argued that to take that privilege
away from the individual through the use of the police power
would not be an abuse of that power. 23 Indeed, a wide range
of authorities supports the view that the states may, without
breach of the privileges and immunities clause of the Consti-
tution, limit or regulate the enjoyment of hunting privileges
by nonresident hunters since that clause does not include
within its scope special privileges secured to citizens in their
own states.
24
The difficulty in this type of case, however, arises when the
20 Winslow v. Fleischner, 112 Ore. 23, 228 Pac. 101 (1924). Cf. Lacoste v.
Department of Conservation of the State of Louisiana, 263 U.S. 545 (1924);
Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908). In Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504
(1896), it was held that ownership of game in territory acquired by the Federal
Government after the adoption of the Constitution was in the Federal Govern-
ment for the use and benefit of its people. When a new state was formed from
the territory, however, it acquired the rights of the Federal Government upon
admission into the union. In view of the exclusive control which the Federal
Government has now assumed with respect to migratory waterfowl, it may be
argued that so far as these birds are concerned the Federal Government has
now reassumed ownership. If this is so, then South Dakota has passed a statute
concerning something which does not belong to it.
21 Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Dobie v. State, 120 Tex.
Crim. App. 72, 48 S.W.2d 289 (1932); Ex parte Blardone, 55 Tex. Crim. App.
189, 115 S.W. 838 (1909). Cf. Ex parte Prindle, 7 Cal. Unrep. 223, 94 Pac. 871
(1905).
22 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1919). As between the state
and its own inhabitants, under present precedents, the state may control the
taking and possession of migratory waterfowl. But neither the state nor the
individual may claim ownership until possession actually can be had, since
possession is the basis of ownership. See United States v. 2,271.29 Acres, 31
F.2d 617, 621 (W.D.Wis. 1928), where it was said that, ". . . it is clear, also,
that the right to regulate the taking and use of game and fish is, generally
speaking, in the state as an attribute of its sovereignty, subject only to valid
exercise of authority under provisions of the Fededral Constitution."
23 See Magner v People, 97 Ill. 320, 334 (1881): "To hunt and kill- game is a
boon or a privilege granted either expressly or impliedly by the sovereign
authority - not a right inherent in each individual, and consequently nothing
is taken away from the individual when he is denied the privilege at stated
seasons of hunting and killing game."
24 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1913); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1876); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3,230 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180
(U.S. 1868).
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animals in question are migratory. So far as migratory ani-
mals are concerned, as Mr. Justice Holmes indicated in Mis-
souri v. Holland, the states appear to stand in a different po-
sition. The recent case of Toomer v. Witsell,25 involving an
attempt on the part of Sohth Carolina to charge nonresident
commercial fishermen a license fee one hundred times greater
than those charged resident fishermen for the taking of migra-
tory shrimp, illustrates the difficulty.
Aimed at securing the residents of South Carolina a mo-
nopoly of shrimp fishing in South Carolina waters, the discri-
minatory license schedule was held a violation of the privileges
and immunities clause, despite the claim of South Carolina
that the state's ownership of the shrimp made such discrimina-
tion legally justifiable. "The whole ownership theory," said
the court, "in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people
that a State has power to preserve and regulate the exploita-
tion of an important resource." 26
Although presenting a situation clearly analogous to the
development in South Dakota, Toomer v. WitseU can be dis-
tinguished from the South Dakota decision upholding the ex-
clusionary statute on the ground that what was involved in
Toomer v. WitseU was a commercial enterprise. It has long
been settled law that the privileges and immunities clause pro-
tects the rights of nonresidents to enter into any state of the
Union to do business.2T Yet the court's statement concerning
state ownership of migratory animals appears to expose the
weakness of the position taken in South Dakota. If the South
Dakota statute is to be upheld, it will have to be on some
basis other than the "slender reed" of the title theory.28
It seems obvious that the distinction between the taking of
25 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The majority opinion in the case stated: "Like many
other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an
absolute. It does bar. discrimination against citizens of other states where there
is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they
are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment
in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for
it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons
do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to
them." Id. at 396. See also Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1948), involving a California statute which banned Japanese aliens from
commercial fishing inside the California three mile limit
26 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
27 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (U.S. 1870). See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S.
37, 52-53 (1920).
28 CI. Pavel v. Pattison, 24 F. Supp. 915 (D. La. 1939).
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wild animals for sport and the taking of wild animals as a
commercial enterprise is, however, a substantial one. Thus, a
Louisiana statute which denied nonresident land owners the
right to trap alligators on lands within the State was declared
unconstitutional in 1939 by a federal court on the ground that
it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as the property rights guaranteed there-
under.2 9 Involved in the case was a commercial trapping right.
A relationship may be found, undoubtedly, between the
statutes discriminating against out-of-state hunters and the
tax statutes which have .been declared unconstitutional be-
cause they discriminate unlawfully, especially in view of the
fact that a hunting license fee is in the nature of a tax. 0
Reasonable discrimination or classification is recognized as
being both lawful and desirable where a particular evil is
sought to be prevented or mitigated,8 1 but the class discrimi-
nated against must be a fairly well-defined group in order
that the evil-doers may be uniformly treated. It is not enough
to punish them as a class if the same thing may be done by
others who may go unpunished.
2
Thus, a statute which would give to minors the right to
hunt without paying license fees therefor has been declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it discriminates through
arbitrary classification."3 So too, a statute which requires that
the applicant for a hunting license be a qualified voter in order
for him to be eligible for a hunting license was declared dis-
criminatory against a particular class.84 However, a state
may enact a statute which provides that a citizen need not ob-
tain a hunting license to enable him to hunt within his own
county.3 5 The state may charge nonresident hunters a hunt-
ing license fee although it does not charge residents a hunting
license fee.38 And it has been held that the state may com-
pletely ban nonresident non-landholding hunters from hunt-
ing within the state 37 although it could not ban nonresident
29 Pavel v. Pattison, supra note 28.
3o Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934); Travis v. Yale Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60 (1920).
31 See Rosenthai v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 270 (1912).
32 See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1913).
33 State v. Erickson, 159 Minn. 287, 198 N.W. 1000 (1924). But see Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 160 (1912).
34 State v. Johnson, 172 Ark. 866, 291 S.W. 89 (1927).
35 State v. Koock, 202 Mo. 223, 100 S.W. 630 (1907).
38 In re Eberle, 98 Fed. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1899).
37 State v. Stokes, 117 Ark. 192, 174 S.W. 1156 (1915).
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landholders from hunting on their own lands if otherwise
qualified to hunt.8 Likewise, it has been held that a state may
completely bar nonresident salmon fishing,39 but in light of
Toomer v. WitseU, supra, it is very likely these holdings are
no longer to be accepted without serious qualification, since
the statutes on which the cases rested are completely exclu-
sionary.o
It would appear quite probable that should the South Dakota
statute be taken before a higher court, it could not be held un-
constitutional on the ground that it infringes the privileges
and immunities clause,' 1 although in the case of out-of-state
residents who own land in the state, it might be construed as
a taking of private property without due process."' It should
be remembered, however, that the Federal Government's in-
terest in migratory waterfowl is not based on its interest in
preserving hunting alone.4 3 It has been pointed out by at least
one court that the well-being of the nation is founded upon a.
favorable balance between insects and the wildfowl which
control them." This fact furnishes a potent reason for sug-
gesting that in the case of migratory waterfowl, the old
theory of exclusive ownership of the states - already re-
pudiated in Missouri v. Holland - should not be used. to allow
state interference with the federal control of migratory wild-
life.
In light of previous decisions by the high court it is doubt-
ful that the Federal Government could rely solely upon the
commerce clause of the Constitution 45 to regulate the taking
88 State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S.W. 955 (1904). This case and State v.
Stokes, supra note 37, suggest some very important qualifications to the South
Dakota statute. Thus, under State v. Mallory, supra, it is clear that a resident of
Minnesota owning land in South Dakota could not be prohibited from hunting in
South Dakota upon his own land. State v. Stokes, supra, held, however, that non-
residents of Arkansas who merely purchased hunting rights on land could not
thereby evade the Arkansas exclusionary statute. But ef. Pavel v. Pattison, 24 F.
Supp. 915 (D.La. 1939).
89 McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); State v. Tower, 84 Me. 444,
24 Atl. 898 (1892); State v. Catholic, 75 Ore. 367, 147 Pac. 372 (1915); State v.
Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855).
40 See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1948).
" U.S. Const., Amendment XIV.
42 State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236, 83 S.W. 955 (1904).
48 Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942).
44 See Shouse v. Moore, 11 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D.Ky. 1935).
5 "U.S. Const. Art. I, §8.
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of migratory waterfowl."8 But it has been suggested that the
Federal Government could again gain the cooperation of the
states in respect to fair resident and nonresident hunting
privilege laws by denying to noncooperating states the right
to share in the distribution of Pittman-Robertson funds,
4 7
much as the Federal Government administers federal grants
for the construction of state highways. Since Pittman-Robert-
son funds are derived from the sale of federal migratory
waterfowl hunting stamps and from excise taxes on hunting
arms and ammunition, the Federal Government may justi-
fiably feel that to deny to nonresident hunters the right to
shoot waterfowl in those states particularly fortunate in be-
ing located in favorable flyways would be unjust and therefore
a reason to withhold distribution of such funds.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - IMPLIED CONTRACTS -
LIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPALITY THEREON
T HE EXTENT to which a public corporation may be held on
an improperly executed contract was recently considered
by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Northwestern Sheet
& Iron Work8 v. Sioux County,' which placed squarely before
46 See, e.g., Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1918) ; Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519 (1896). Contra: State of Kansas v. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127 (1877).
See Corwin, Game Protection and the Constitution, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 619
(1916): "Suppose, therefore, we concede the proprietorship of the state* in its
wild game to the fullest extent, what then is the legal character of the migra-
tion of game from one state to another, considered in their aspect of successive
proprietors of such game? Obviously it is that of transfer of property across
state lines from one legal person to another, that is, 'Commerce.' True, the
transfer is not by contract between the legal persons involved, but rather by
the operation of a kind of legal prescription; yet it is none the less a legal
transfer, and it is 'among states.' Nor is it a.mere casual occurence, as for in-
stance where a dog might elect to change masters, but it is a regularly recurrent,
seasonal and predictable process, which, even though not susceptible of 'regula-
tion' in many senses of the word, certainly ought to be capable of being pro-
tected by the government of the larger community which is benefitted by it."
47 50 Stat. 917 (1937), 16 U.S.C. §§669-669J (1940).
136 N.W. 2d 605 .'N.D. 1949). The county contended that it was not hound
by orders of the county, commissioners made in their individual capacity before
the advertisements were even made. They further contended that notice for bids
was not published the required length of time, nor was there compliance with
the lowest bid statute. The plaintiff pleaded estoppel and ratification, comming-
ling two theories of recovery, and claimed the "agreed and reasonable value,"
but the defendant made no motion for election of theories. The county unsuccess-
fully tried to distinguish between the case of Stark County v. City of Dickinson,
56 N.D. 371, 217 N.W. 525 (1928), which allowed assumpsit, and Backhaus v.
Lee, 49 N.D. 821, 194 N.W. 887 (1923), a case in equity.
